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Abstract
Vulnerabilities and Threats in IPv6 Environment This thesis reviews
IPv6 security with focus on Local Area Networks and IDS/IPS systems.
It compares IPv4 and IPv6 threats, vulnerabilities and gives basic security
recommendations. Selected IPv6 attacks and exploits are demonstrated in
simulated attacker/victim scenario on IPv6 network. These experiments are
then used to set up guidelines for evaluating usability of IDS/IPS appliances
against IPv6-specific threats.
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performance of the appliance as it may be when deployed in real environ-
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1 Preface
The Internet today is in a strange situation. Global pool of available IPv4
address has been already depleted and IPv6 is has not been widely utilized
yet. There can be rather a long discussion about the cause. Seems like
the popular IT phrase “If it works, don’t fix it.” applies once again. This,
however, is not a sustainable state. It is already late and IPv6 deployment
growth will have to hurry up to catch up with current Internet growth.
One of the obstacles to be overcome is the fear of unknown. IPv4 has been
around for years and best practices are well proven. The biggest challenge of
the Internet today is the one of security. When IPv4 was designed, security
was not a major concern. The current security requirements were known to
IPv6 designers and IPv6 is hopefully expected to fulfill them.
This works could help to answer the importat question whether IPv6 is
more secure than IPv4. It is intended to gather current knowledge regarding
the security of IPv6. It shall build on experience gained through IPv4 and
highlight the differences. Threats and known vulnerabilities of the protocol
will be discussed and examined as well as appropriate basic countermeasures
to address them. The focus will be intrusion detection/intrusion prevention
systems and local area networks.
Another common concern is that IPv6 implementations are not mature
enough. List of Commom Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) associated
with IPv6 sides the argument. As IPv6 is not widely used, it is not widely
tested either. Practical part shall zero in on particular vulnerabilities and
available testing tools. The output shall be a know-how how to utilize these
tools in the name of improving security. Testing will be performed on avail-
able IDS/IPS solution. Nevertheless, the guidelines shall be easily adjustable
so such testing can be performed on almost any security system.
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2 Internet Protocol version 6
The reason behind Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) development is to ad-
dress shortcomings of its predecessor, Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4),
maninly the size of its address space. New features needed in the modern
world such as mobility and security are introduced on this occasion. IPv6 has
been developed for a rather long period of time. Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) recommended IPv6 in [RFC 1752], published in January 1995,
thus there have been rather big expectations from IPv6 over the years.
Nevertheless, it should be always taken into account that IPv6 introduces
changes at the third layer of the ISO/OSI model (outlined in Figure 2.1) while
other layers are mostly unaffected. Possible drawbacks of other layers are still
present and remain intact.
Figure 2.1: ISO/OSI Model and TCP/IP Stack
Layer 3 of the ISO/OSI model, Network Layer, provides logical addressing
which is used by routers for path determination. It is responsible for packet
forwarding and data transfers among hosts on different networks.
2
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2.1 IPv6 Features and Benefits
The most significant differences between IPv4 and IPv6 can be listed and
briefly described as follows:
Adress space and addressing Main reason for IPv6 deployment - IP ad-
dress is 128 bits long, instead of 32 bits. This should provide enough
addresses (up to 2128) for forseeable future. Addresses are usually writ-
ten in hexadecimal notation, see Figure 2.2 for an example. Multi-
cast addresses designed for efficient one-to-many communicaton and
anycast for redundant services (also known as one-to-one-of-many) are
introduced. On the contrary, broadcasts are not implemented.
Figure 2.2: Example of an IPv6 Address
Route Aggregation IPv6 addresses should be assigned hierarchically. The
structure then provides for simple summarization and consequently for
lighter exchange of routing information on the Internet. The large ad-
dress space allows organizations to obtain continous blocks of addresses,
which should be assigned by Internet service providers.
Autoconfiguration Basically a plug-and-play networking, providing the
ability of Stateless Addresses Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) which should
occur without the use of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
as defined in [RFC 4862].
IPv6 Header New header format is defined in [RFC 2460]. In-depth de-
scription can be found therein. It has fixed length of 40 bytes and
is much simpler. Compared to IPv4 header, fields IP Header Length,
Identification, Flags, Fragment Offset and Header Checksum have been
removed. Figure 2.3 illustrates IPv6 packet header format.
With 40 bytes of fixed length and only 8 fields, new header format can
improve processing speeds. Every packet has this base header, which
can be followed by an extension header defined in Next Header field.
Such chaining is outlined in Figure 2.3. For list of all possible Next
Header values please refer to Attachment III.
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Figure 2.3: Format of IPv6 Packet Header
There can be several chained headers in one packet. [RFC 2460] defines
six types of extension headers: Hop-by-hop Option Header, Routing
Header, Fragment Header, Destination Options Header, Authentication
Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload Header (ESP). The
latter two will be discussed in detail in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, others
when needed.
Figure 2.4: IPv6 Extension Headers Chaining Example
Improved Transmission Fragmentation as known from IPv4 does not ac-
tually exist in IPv6. It does not happen at intermediate nodes, packets
can be fragmented at source nodes only [RFC 2460]. Routers’ need
for fragmentation is eliminated by mechanism called Path Maximum
Transmission Unit Discovery (PMTU) defined in [RFC 1981]. This
mechanism is used by nodes to determine maximum transmission unit
size. The source node then uses Fragment Header when packet frag-
mentation is needed.
QoS Support Quality of Service (QoS) support is facilitated within the
IPv6 packet. Flows can be labeled (using Traffic Class and Flow label
header fields), enabling routers to recognize appropriate flows to which
packets belong and making it possible for high priority packets to arrive
to their destination in a timely manner. More information can be found
in [RFC 3697].
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Mobility Support Mobile IPv6 protocol (MIPv6) brings support for mov-
ing a node from one network to another wihtout losing connectivity. By
retaining its Home Address (HoA), nodes can disconnect and reconnect
at different place in internet topology (as defined in [RFC 6275]). Vast
address space is essential for this mechanism.
Native End-to-End Security Unlike IPv4, where support for Internet Pro-
tocol Security (IPsec) is optional, its implementation in IPv6 is man-
dated. It provides data integrity by sender authentication and op-
tionally data confidentiality through encryption. In IPv4 world, IPsec
typically provides security between border routers (typically for VPN
access) due to NAT limitations. There is no need for NAT in IPv6
world, therefore IPsec can be utilized for securing end-to-end commu-
nications. However, use of IPsec is not required.
The latter will be discussed in detail in the following chapter as security is
crucial for this work. No other explicit security feature has been introduced
in IPv6. Implicit security consequences, threat comparison and security con-
siderations of the protocol will be discussed in Chapter 4. Main differences
between IPv4 and IPv6 can be summarized as in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Summary of Differences Between IPv4 and IPv6 [5]
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3 IP Security with IPv6
Native IP security support is the most beneficial IPv6 feature from security
perspective. IPsec is a security framework defined in [RFC 4301]. It secures
data on the network level, providing security for upper-layers’ data.
Important part of the concept is the idea behind Security Association (SA).
SA is a one-way relationship between source and destination, therefore two
SAs are necessary for two-way comunnication between hosts. The SA de-
fines IPsec type, mode and all associated parameteres such as encryption
algorithm with related keys and so on. Every SA is associated with a policy
which determines how the incoming, resp. outgoing packet will be handled.
Keys for the communication purposes are negotiated, hosts mutually authen-
ticated and SAs established using Internet Key Exchange protocol, currently
version 2 (IKEv2) as defined in [RFC 5996].
As it has been already briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, IPsec uti-
lizes two of the newly introduced extension headers - Authentication Header
and Encapsulating Security Payload header. They may be used separately
or combined together to provide desired level of security. IPsec can be used
in one of two modes, namely in tunnel mode or transport mode.
3.1 Authentication Header
Authentication Header (AH), as defined in [RFC 4302], is designated to
provide data integrity, origin authentication and protection against replay
attacks. It is specified by value 51 in Next Header field of the preceding
header. Format of AH is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Format of Authentication Header
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Particular fields in the Authentication Header can be briefly described as
follows.
Next Header This field determines the following header. Numbers are reg-
istered by IANA and all possible values are listed in Attachment III.
Payload Len AH payload length in 32 bits words minus “2”.
Reserved Reserved bits for future use. Values must be initialized to zero.
Security Parameters Index (SPI) 32-bit value that the target host uses
to identify appropriate Security Association.
Sequence Number Field Unsigned 32-bit counter field which is increased
by one for every packet. In other words, it is a packet sequence number.
Integrity Check Value (ICV) Value of this field is comupted from im-
mutable headers of the packet, AH and all immutable fields behind
it. It must be a multiple of 32 bits and is verifed by target host thus
providing data integrity.
Figure 3.2: Authentication Header in Transport Mode
In transport mode (as illustrated in Figure 3.2), original IPv6 header is
not altered. Only Authentication Header is added behind it. Where in tunnel
mode (as illustrated in Figure 3.3), original packet is encapsulated in new,
protected packet and Authentication Header is added behind the new IPv6
packet. However, both modes authenticate the whole packet.
Figure 3.3: Authentication Header in Tunnel Mode
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3.2 Encapsulating Security Payload
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header, as defined in [RFC 4303],
provides data confidentiality, integrity (if required) and limited origin au-
thentication. Its is specified by value 50 in Next Header field of the preceding
header. Format of ESP is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Format of Encapsulating Security Payload Header
Particular fields in the Encapsulating Security Payload header can be briefly
described as follows.
Security Parameters Index (SPI) 32-bit value that the target host uses
to identify appropriate Security Association.
Sequence Number Unsigned 32-bit counter field which is increased by one
for every packet. In other words, it is a packet sequence number.
Payload Data This field contains data from the original packet. The data
are protected against tampering and disclosure by an encryption.
Padding Bytes added in order to align bytes for encryption purposes.
Pad Length Field indicating the number of padding bytes in the Padding
field. Valid range is from “0” to “255”.
Next Header This field determines the following header. Numbers are reg-
istered by IANA and all possible values are listed in Attachment III.
Integrity Check Value (ICV) Is optional field computed from the ESP
header, payload and ESP trailer. It is present only when integrity
service is in use. The length depends on algorithm used.
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Figure 3.5: Encapsulating Security Payload in Transport Mode
When ESP operates in transport mode (as illustrated in Figure 3.5), only
Layer 3 payload is protected by encryption, original IPv6 header is left un-
touched. Operation in tunnel mode (as illustrated in Figure 3.6) encapsulates
original packet in new, encrypted packet. This mode is considered more se-
cure, because the true sender’s and receiver’s IP addresses are kept secret.
This, however, applies only for communication between security gates and
not for end-to-end transmissions. In both cases, significant part of the packet
can be authenticated employing EPS ICV trailer.
Figure 3.6: Encapsulating Security Payload in Tunnel Mode
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4 IPv4 and IPv6 Threat Comparison
It can not be decided whether IPv6 is more secure than IPv4 or not. IPv6
does not introduce a significant improvement apart from prospective IPsec
widespread use. The differences between these two protocols are, in most
cases, double-edged. Some security threats are very similar or have slightly
different considerations; some were mitigated while others were newly intro-
duced.
4.1 Threats with New Considerations
This chapter will discuss threats and attacks with new considerations. It
contains those where different approcach is needed due to IPv6 adoption and
both the ones where the situation is more complicated for adversary and the
ones that endanger the security more.
4.1.1 Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance is first phase of every attack (together with information gath-
ering) and therefore accomplishing good result in this phase is an important
building block for subsequent phases. As mentioned at the beginnig of Chap-
ter 2, IPv6 has different address scheme. It implies need for a different ap-
proach to reconnaissance.
With 128-bit long addresses and typical subnet prefix of /64 it will be sig-
nificantly time-consuming to scan the subnets for live hosts. Assuming 10 000
hosts uniformly distributed in such subnet and using traditional brute-force
ping sweeps scan, “even at a scan rate of 1 million probes per second (more
than 400 Mbps of traffic), it would take more than 28 years of constatnt
scanning to find the first active host” [4]. With more typical subnet with 100
hosts, the math is even more interesting, “the number jumps to more than 28
centuries of constant 1-million-packet-per-second scanning to find first host
on that first subnet of the victim network” [4]. However, several techniques
to speed up this process exist. These are discussed in Chapter 6.
10
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It can be expected that adversary will detour network scanning and focus
rather on DNS servers. The servers will be precious source of information.
Because IPv6 addresses are generally not easy to remember, dynamic DNS
will likely be adopted by administrators. Any patterns or sequences in nodes
addressing should be avoided.
4.1.2 Smurf Attacks
Broadcast apmilification attacks, often referred to as smurf attacks, are per-
formed by sending ICMP echo request to a broadcast address with spoofed
victims address as source address (as illustrated in Figure 4.1). All nodes on
the broadcast domain then respond to this request by ICMP echo respond
with the formerly spoofed addreess. The victim becomes overwhelmed with
traffic causing denial of service situation as a result.
Adversary
ICMPv6 Echo Request
DST: FF02::1
SRC: Victim
ICMPv6 
Echo Reply
Victim
Figure 4.1: Smurf Attack Scheme
This technique is no longer possible with IPv6 because there are no broad-
casts. However, multicast addresses can be used instead. Several multicast
addresses are currently registered by Internet Assigned Numbers Author-
ity (IANA), please refer to Attachment I. Address FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:1,
11
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or FF02::1 for short, represents all nodes on a segment. So it could be a
great replacement for broadcast address in IPv4. This was taken into ac-
count by IETF and countermeasure is defined in [RFC 4443]. ICMP replies
should not be generated in response to ICMPv6 messages having a multicast
address as a destination. Therefore smurf attack should not be an issue in
IPv6 network where all nodes are compliant to [RFC 4443].
IPv6 can not function without ICMPv6 as its functionalities are a vi-
tal part of the protocol [RFC 4443]. Consequently, it can not be com-
pletely filtered out like it is often done in IPv4. Attention should be paid
to ICMPv6 filtering. IETF defines recommendations for ICMPv6 messages
filtering in [RFC 4890]. The recommendations are summarized in Attach-
ment II.
4.1.3 Address Spoofing
IP address spoofing is widely utilized by adversary to hide origin of the attack
and therefore their identity. The packets are crafted with falsified source
IP address, usually from completely different location. [RFC 2827] defines
protection against spoofing of the network portion of an address. This is done
by filtering on the network’s edge, where packets with source address outside
the valid subnet range are dropped. However, it is not very commonly used
countermeasure.
IPv6 Internet should benefit from hierarchical address assignment. Al-
locations will be easily summarized. As a result, spoofing-preventing filter-
ing should be much easier and in effect more appealing for Internet Service
Providers (ISP) to be implemented. But even without spoofing outside of
customers address ranges, there is vast range of addresses to be spoofed from
within typical IPv6 subnets (264 addresses with /64 prefix).
4.1.4 Routing Security
Corruption of routing information can lead to traffic redirection or connectiv-
ity disruption. Exchange of routing information should be well protected. In
IPv4, routing protocols are commonly protected using cryptographic authen-
tication. Being extended for IPv6 support, these protocols can be divided
into two groups.
12
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First, protocols as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and Intermediate
System-to-Intermediate System (IS-IS) did not change their security mecha-
nism with transition to IPv6. BGP authentication uses TCP MD5 signatures
based on secret shared by appropriate endpoints [RFC 2385]. Similarily, IS-
IS exchanges routing information with keyed-hash message authentication
code based on MD5 algorithm (HMAC-MD5), which provides integrity and
authentication [RFC 3567].
Second, Open Shortest Path First version 3 (OSPFv3) and Routing In-
formation Protocol Next-Generation (RIPng) have removed the means of
authentication. They both rely on IPsec to provide protection to routing
information exchange [2]. IPsec mechanisms are discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 3.
4.1.5 ARP and DHCP Attacks
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Dynamic Host Configuration Pro-
tocol (DHCP) are the protocols responsible for host initialization in IPv4
networks. Host initialization via DHCP is vulnerable to spoofed responses
from rogue DHCP servers. Information obtained from DHCP is IP address,
DNS server addres and default gateway. When replaced by adversary, it
enables for man-in-the-middle attacks. ARP is used for resolving MAC-IP
address pairs. It can be spoofed as well, thus again enabling for MITM
attacks.
There is no ARP on IPv6 networks. This functionality was replaced
with Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) mechanism provided by ICMPv6.
Threats endangering NDP are discuseed in Section 4.2.2. Altough the func-
tion of DHCP can be partially replaced by stateless address autoconfigura-
tion (SLAAC), it does not provided information like DNS and NTP servers.
SLAAC can be complemented or completely replaced by DHCPv6.
DHCPv6 is not an extension of traditional DHCP, it is a new protocol
defined in [RFC 3315]. But unfortunately, it is vulnerable to very similar
threats. It can face starvation or DoS when too many addresses is requested,
it has no additional security for preventing rogue devices. When DHCPv6
with sequential allocation is in place, it can spare a lot of adversary’s time
needed for network scanning.
13
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4.1.6 Internet Worms
Worm is a type of malware designed to exploit a specific vulnerability in
a system and then use it to propagate to other systems through the same
flaws. Worms may be used to spread virus infection, trojan horses and so on.
Worms together with viruses are a significant problem of today’s networking.
The basic principles of worms infection does not change with IPv6. It
affects ability to propagate of those worms which utilize network scanning
to find new targets. The vast and sparsely populated address space of IPv6
will definitely slow down the worm propagation. Other forms of prolifera-
tion (through email, instant messaging, peer-to-peer aplication etc.) remain
the same. It can be expected that worm developers will focus on these means
of propagation or new techniques will be adopted. According to [2], these
could be for example: targeting Domain Name Systems (DNS) lookups, sniff-
ing neighbor solicitation packets and routing updates or exploit multicast
addresses (please refer to Attachment I).
14
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4.2 Newly Introduced Threats
New functionalities always broaden the attack surface available for adversary.
As security becomes more and more crucial nowadays, the security aspects
should be always considered when designing new feature. To avoid unneces-
sary risk exposure, unused features and service should be always disabled or
handled properly (initialized to zero. . .).
4.2.1 Extension Header Threats
Extension headers are where all the options from IPv4 packet header were
moved to. Extension header is specified in Next Header (NH) field of the pre-
ceding one. Recommended order of the headers in a packet as per [RFC 2460]
follows:
1. IPv6 Header
2. Hop-by-Hop Options Header
3. Destination Options Header
4. Routing Header
5. Fragment Header
6. Authentication Header
7. Encapsulating Security Payload Header
8. Destination Options Header
9. Upper-layer header
The headers can be chained and used multiple times almost without re-
strictions. [RFC 2460] states that “IPv6 nodes must accept and attempt to
process extension headers in any order and occurring any number of times
in the same packet, except for the Hop-by-Hop Options Header which is re-
stricted to appear immediately after an IPv6 header only.” Sending bogus or
endless combinations may lead to increased resources consumption and even-
tually to DoS. The headers may be also crafted in a way to bypass security
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systems. Additionally, there are some specific threats linked to Hop-by-Hop
Options Header and Routing Header.
Hop-by-Hop Options Header First extension header to appear in a packet,
if present. It contains information that must be processed on every in-
termediate node. Structure of the header is outlined in Figure 4.2.
One of the options is the Router Alert option which indicates that a
router should inspect the packet as the information is carries may be
valuable for the router. Flood of packet with this option on may de-
crease performance or even cause denial of service. According to [21],
the Router Alert option can be misused to bypass access list (ACL)
restrictions. [21] describes a situation, where ICMPv6 Echo Request
message with Router Alert option bypassed ACL restriction. The re-
quest was let through although it was forbidden by ACL.
Another possibly problematic option is the Jumbo Payload option.
IPv6 jumbograms defined in [RFC 2675] are packets that carry payload
bigger than 65 535 octets (up to one byte less than 4GiB). These packet
can be misused to cause DoS by consumption of resources. Proper
inspection of jumbograms will very likely be challenging for security
systems such as firewalls and IDS/IPS. Furthermore, most of the IPsec
implementations do not support jumbograms [5].
Figure 4.2: Format of Hop-by-Hop Header
Routing Header This type of header, with structure as outlined in Fig-
ure 4.3, is used to list intermadiate nodes the packet should pass through
on its way to the destination. Currently, there are three types of Rout-
ing Header - Type 0, 1 and 2. Type 2 is used fro Mobile IPv6, Type
1 is used by a DARPA project and Type 0 is currently deprecated
by [RFC 5095] due to severe security ramifications. It could be used
to launch MITM or DoS attacks, bounce traffic off a host to bypass
security restrictions, etc. Packets with Type 0 Routing Header (RH0)
must not be proccessed by nodes and is no longer required to be im-
plemented.
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Figure 4.3: Format of Routing Header
4.2.2 Neighbor Discovery
As it has been already mentioned in this work, Neighbor Discovery Proto-
col (NDP) is a replacement of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) which is
based on elements of ICMPv6. ICMPv6 is inseparable part of IPv6 protocol
and cannot be completely filtered out. Recommendation for filtering can be
found in Attachment II. Elements of NDP provide for:
• autoconfiguration, prefixes and other configuration,
• Duplicate Address Detection,
• ARP-like address resolution,
• neighboring routers discovery,
• Neighbor Unreachability Detection,
• and redirection.
Most of these mechanisms can be exploited for malicious activity. For-
merly, no additional security to this mechanism was introduced. The NDP
itself is vulnerable to different types of spoofing, redirection, replay and DoS
attacks. The attacks will be descibred in detail in Chapter 6.3. IETF later
on specified Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) in [RFC 3971]. SEND uses
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) defined in [RFC 3972] to im-
prove security of NDP. Please refer to Figure 4.4 for a schematic outline.
CGA are based on asymetric cryptography, namely RSA algorithm. When
using CGA, the lower 64 bits of their IPv6 address are generated from the
network prefix, random number and public key using SHA-1. The parame-
ters are then sent by NDP so it can be verified by communication partner.
The whole SEND message is digitally signed. However, CGA may also be
exploited for DoS attacks. Please refer to Section 6.3.7.
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Figure 4.4: Cryptographically Generated Addresses [5]
4.2.3 Quality of Services
The threats associated with IPv6 QoS explicit improvements are not of high
severity. The header fields Type of Service and Flow Label are not pro-
tected from tampering, although [RFC 3697] specifies them as non-alterable.
Adversary could gain benefits by modifying these fields while in transmit,
leading into fraudulent use of prefered traffic streams. Firewalls, ACLs and
IDS/IPS solutions should not make decisions based only on these fields. QoS
can be used together with IPsec so it should be taken into account that in-
formation about upper layer protocols may not be accessible for inspection.
4.2.4 Mobile IPv6
Although MIPv6 was designed with security as a primary concern [5], several
opportunities for malicious activity were left open. MIPv6 is susceptible to
wide range of attacks such as rogue home agent, man-in-the-middle threats,
interception, hijacking, spoofing and DoS attacks. As the nodes are moving,
centralized security systems are bypassed so security of the mobile devices
should be put into the spotlight.
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Most attacks involve modification or forging Binding Update (BU) mes-
sages, IPv6 headers, home or Care-of Address (CoA) [5]. Attacks including
DoS opportunities, taken from [5], are as follows:
• Inducing extra BUs with bogus CNs (Correspondent Node). Although
no satisfactory defense exists, route optimization is optional, and the
tradeoff is to risk suboptimal routing. A MN (Mobile Node) can be
selective about route optimization.
• Preventing a legitimate BU from completing while sending bogus BU
to CN (where the attacker is on the same link as the victim).
• Reflection attacks, whereby the victim’s address is forged as the source,
so that the victim is flooded with replies.
• Replaying old route optimization BUs, especially if sequence numbers
are unreliable because of crashes or rollover.
• Bypassing firewall egress filtering with a forged Home Address Option.
4.2.5 IPv6 Latent Threats in IPv4 Networks
Last in this section are IPv6 latent threats in IPv4 only networks. These
threats should be mentioned in this work as well, becease they were intro-
duced together with IPv6 support on network devices and operating systems.
The fact, that IPv6 is not in use on particular network does not mean it
should be ignored. As long as network devices understand the protocol and
the features are not turned off, an attack can be performed over IPv6.
The following actions can be performed by an IPv6 capable node on an
IPv4 network. List is taken from [2].
• Roam to an IPv6-enabled wireless hotspot: The Router Adver-
tisements (RA) sent by the wireless router immediately connect the
host to the IPv6 Internet.
• Receive a forged RA messages: The host is configured to use
IPv6 (albeit with only local connectivity if the attacker does not for-
ward the IPv6 traffic to the Internet).
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• Use a routable IPv4 address: Enables 6to4 connectivity to the
Internet (assuming that there is no firewall blocking protocol 41).
• Existence of the DNS name of isatap.example.org: Initiates an
ISATAP tunnel to this name (again assuming that there is no firewall
blocking protocol 41).
• Teredo tunnel to connect to an IPv6-only mode: If the NAT/firewall
devices allow outbound UDP packets and if the NAT function is quite
open (not applicable to IOS routers), a Teredo hole is punched in
the firewall and allows every IPv6 Internet machine to connect to the
Teredo client.
Once connected to IPv6 network, all IPv6 security considerations applies
to the node. It can face any of the threats mentioned in this chapter as well
as dual-stack or transitions mechanisms (tunnels) related threats. These are,
however, out of the scope of this work.
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4.3 Indifferent Threats
Attacks which were not significantly altered by IPv6 introduction are listed
and briefly discussed in this section.
Application and Other Layers Attacks This paragraph covers all attacks
outside the third layer of the ISO/OSI model. These layers remain un-
touched by IPv6 adoption, so the same considerations applicable for
IPv4 networks are applicable in IPv6 environment as well.
Flooding During this attack, a network defice is flooded with more traffic
that it is able to process. This leads to a denial of service (DoS)
situation. Any IPv6 network faces the same challenges in the matter
of defence againts flooding attacks as an IPv4 network.
Man-in-the-middle A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is act of eaves-
dropping on the network communications. It is often part of the gain-
ing access phase of an attack. The mechanism is outlined in Fig-
ure 4.5: an adversary positions themself in the middle of communica-
tion stream (2), while the originally communicating entities still believe
they communicate directly (1). The data can be modified or misused.
Countermeasures for IPv6, such as IPsec or strong data encryption and
mutual authentication, are the same as for IPv4. IPv6 functionalities
may introduce new means to accomplish MITM attack.
Victim Server
Adversary
(1)
(2)(2)
Figure 4.5: Man-in-the-middle Attack Scheme
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Rogue Device Any unauthorized device on the network is called a rogue
device. The most common rogue device threat, often called evil twin,
is unauthorized wireless access point (WAP) placed on local area net-
work (LAN). This type of threat is not changed for IPv6.
Sniffing A sniffing attack occurs when an adversary tries and succeeds to
capture network traffic without authorization. The captured traffic can
be then used for data analysis or replay attack. Alike IPv4, the only
mechanism to protect data transported over the network in IPv6 is
encryption.
Distributed Denial of Service This kind of attack is very similar to above-
mentioned flooding attack, which is often refered to as denial of service
attack. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack leads to bandwith
or resources exhaustion as well but involves more then one attacking
machine (usually hundreds to thousands). These machines were in-
fected by malicious software which makes them “listen” to adversary’s
commands. When an adversary orders, the whole group of machines,
called botnet, starts flooding the target.
This type of attack remains present in the IPv6 world. Furthermore,
IPv6 addressing makes it possible for more devices to join the Internet
which can result in even more powerful DDoS attacks.
Fragmentation Threats Fragmentation in IPv4 was often used to bypass
security systems and to hide attack patterns. Fragmentation as we
know it does not exist in IPv6 where fragmentation by intermediary
nodes is prohibited [RFC 2460]. However, packets may be fragmented
by the source node and therefore adversary can use the same techniques
to obfuscate attacks. Only minimum MTU differs, for IPv6 it is 1280
octets, and every fragment has to contain a Fragment Header (outlined
in Figure 4.6). Packets smaller than minimum MTU should be dropped
unless it is the last fragment (More Bit, represented as M in Figure 4.6.,
is set to “0” value for the last fragment).
Figure 4.6: Format of Fragment Header
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5 IDS/IPS Technology Overview
Intrusion detection and/or prevention system, IDS/IPS 1, is a transparent,
complementary security solution (hardware or software) to firewalls. It is an
important security capabilty designed to detect (and potentionaly react to)
the presence of unwanted activity in real-time.
The difference between IDS and IPS is, in most cases, in the settings of
particular appliance. However, IDS and IPS can be two different solutions.
It will be refered to IDS/IPS as to a one appliance hereafter. Generally, IDS
are used in a passive way to only detect potential problems. Typical IDS re-
sponses could be increased logging granularity or administrator notification.
IPS are used in more active way, to detect unwanted activities and prevent
adversary attempts from becoming successful. They can interact and inter-
fere with communications considered as unwanted. Both types also differ in
the way they are deployed (refer to Figure 5.1). IDS are often placed outside
the main communication stream, f.e. on mirrored ports. IPS must be placed
in-line (all incoming data streams have to through the appliance) in order to
be able to interfere with the transmissions.
Internet
DMZ
IDS/IPS
Workstations
Internet
Edge Router
Workstations
Inline Protection Detection on Mirrored Port
DMZ
Edge Router
IDS/IPS
on Switch 
SPAN Port
Figure 5.1: Possible Deployment Schemes
1By IDS/IPS in this work is meant Network Intrusion Detecion System/Network Intru-
sion Prevention system, often refered to as NIDS/NIPS. There is also host-based IDS/IPS,
sometimes refered to as HIDS/HIPS.
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The appliance can be placed both in front of and behind a firewall. The
concern here is if we want to detect and/or prevent external or internal threats
towards DMZ. Ideal but costly solution is to obtain two appliances and place
one in each direction.
IDS/IPS solutions are most reliable for detecting attacks at upper layers
of ISO/OSI model or network-focused attacks, such as denial of service (DoS)
attacks where adversary tries to exhaust bandwith capacity; but it can de-
tect bug exploits, flaw and port scanning. It monitors traffic patterns, scans
header informations and examines the contents of packets to detect any ma-
licious content and impending security breaches or attacks. Based on how
it is configured, it can react in real time and take action to reduce potential
damage. Most common responses are to drop packets, disconnect sessions,
reset connections, shutdown the server, trigger alerts and so on.
Additionally, IDS/IPS appliances are can be used for auditing purposes.
In other words, they just detect if particular software or protocol is in use
on observed network. It then logs source and destination addresses, number
and time of occurences and even the certain packets.
There are three commonly used detection mechanisms available: behavior-
based, signature-based and anomaly-based.
Behavior-based Is a mechanism, which watches the ongoing network activ-
ity and looks for suspicious events. In other words, behavior-based de-
tection is baselined on everyday activity and looks for anything that de-
viates. This technology allows to detect any differece, including uknown
issues such as zero-day attacks. Baseline establisment is considered to
be rather difficult process, to define what is “normal” can be challeng-
ing.
Signature-based This detection mechanism compares event patterns against
known attack patterns, signatures, stored in the appliance database.
Consequently, its detection capabilty is limited only to known signa-
tures and malicious activity. Therefore, new and zero day attacks can
not be revealed. Similarity to antivirus software solutions comes to
mind. Regular updates are crucial.
Anomaly-based Detection method, which relies on definitions of all kinds
of valid activity is called anomaly-based. It is commonly used for pro-
tocols, because all the valid forms of a protocol are known and clearly
defined in RFCs. Deviations from those forms are then identified as
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anomalies. Drawback of this method is obvious - just because the traf-
fic follows defined standards, the content can not be considered as not
malicious.
5.1 IPv6 Considerations
For the IDS/IPS sensors, IPv6 is just another protocol they have to “under-
stand”; vendors have to provide new signatures. Sensors need to be powerful
enough to process all the IPv6 headers, which can possibly be chained. Pars-
ing through all the combinations of extension headers and accurate interpre-
tation of options in these headers will probably increase the CPU demands.
The extended range of IPv6 address space can bring a new challenge once
again. Defining rules for unwanted traffic using so-called black-listing can be
extremely demanding on accuracy and system resource as well. Shift towards
white-listing could be expected.
IPsec, the main security feature of IPv6, has two sides. Native encryption
support for end-to-end communication hides its content not only from the
adversary but from any kind of packet inspection efforts as well. Although
a hardware cryptographic acceleration can be utilized for decrypting packets
on-the-fly at high transfer rates, sharing keys of every host on the network
with the IDS/IPS is unrealistic. It would create single point of interest
for adversary and therefore expose the network to a unnecessary security
risk. Because of this, it could be expected that future IDS/IPS solutions
would focus more on flow monitoring and analysis. As mentioned in [3], if
there is lively data exchange with porn site from a company’s computer, the
particular content is not of a high concern.
5.2 Current State
There are six major vendors of IDS/IPS appliances on the market accord-
ing to SANS Institute [6]: Cisco Systems, McAfee, Juniper Networks, IBM,
Sourcefire and Tipping Point. The report is rather old, dated to Novem-
ber 2009, and changes have occured since then. Tipping Point was acquired
by Hewlett-Packard and Check Point Software Technologies should be con-
sidered too. What do they claim about IPv6 support?
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Check Point Software Technologies IDS/IPS from Check Point utilize
“Hybrid Detection Engine which provides full IPv6 support, ensuring
that all attacks currently obfuscated by channeling through IPv6 will
be prevented” [13].
Cisco Systems Networking icon, Cisco, claims to have “more than 10 years
of IPv6 experience” [14] and that their “organization leads the way by
developing standards on the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
and integrating IPv6 into its services and technology portfolio” [14].
First traces of IPv6 support can be found in release notes of IPS sensors
software in 2009, probably only because older release notes are not
available on the company’s website.
Hewlett-Packard The HP’s flagship, HP N Platform Next-Generation In-
trusion Prevention System supports a broad set of traffic types. “It
provides uncompromising IPv4 and IPv6 simultaneous payload inspec-
tion and support for related tunneling variants (4in6, 6in4, 6in6)” [8].
IPv6 support has been metioned in product sheets for all the New Gen-
eration appliances since 2011.
IBM The company claims IPv6 support for IBM Security Network Intrusion
Prevention System (formerly IBM Proventia) G series since 2010 when
firmware release 4.1 was introduced (current release is 4.6). IPv4 is in
the materials mentioned as “legacy”. From the [7]: “With release 4.1
of the IBM Proventia Network IPS firmware, attacks will be identified
and mitigated for IPv6 network traffic as well as legacy IPv4 traffic”.
Juniper Networks Juniper’s IDP series intrusion detection and prevention
appliances run the latest OS 5.1. Excerpt from the software documenta-
tion speaks for itself [9]: “IDP Series devices do not support inspection
of IPv6”. IPv6 packets are dropped by default, passed through only in
so-called bypass mode.
McAfee McAfee’s all network security platforms fromM-series support IPv6
as of 2013 materials [10].
Sourcefire Next-Generation IPS appliances from Sourcefire support IPv6.
In [11] they claim that “Since 2003, Sourcefire has been aggregating
network intelligence to provide “context” to network security defenses”,
where IPv6 is also mentioned. Sourcefire’s IPS use open source Snort
detection engine, which is said to support IPv6 since version 2.8.0 re-
leased in 2009 [12].
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These statements are not actually specific. Phrase “IPv6 supported” does
not say much about the level of reliability and correctness of inspection-based
decisions. As these materials come mostly from the marketing department,
testing of particular solution is needed before acquisition; either on the cus-
tomer’s side (e.g. as a part of proof of concept) or on the vendor’s side (e.g.
during presales activities). It will be goal of the subsequent part of this work
to define guidelines for such testing. It shall cover the fundamental vulner-
abilities of IPv6 which definitely should be recognized by every commercial
IDS/IPS solution.
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6 IPv6 Attacks and Exploits
This chapter will cover the most effective currently known IPv6 attacks. It
will be explained how the attacks work and how to perform them on a network
so this knowledge can be based upon during the testing in the last chapter.
The attacks will be divided, quite unconventionally, not according to ty-
pology (DoS, MITM, etc.) or location of the adversary (local and remote)
but into three plus one certain categories which better serve the purpose of
this work. Namely:
• Reconnaissance - Section 6.1,
• Attacks over IPv6 - Section 6.2,
• Attacks over ICMPv6 - Section 6.3
and one additional chapter which does not discuss particular attacks but
implementation imperfections which are important and lively phenomenon
of the new protocol, Implemenatation Maturity Problems - Section 6.4.
6.1 Reconnaissance
Only network scanning will be discussed in this section as port scanning and
other kinds of information gathering have not changed for IPv6.
6.1.1 Network Scanning
It has been stated in the Section 4.1.1 that network scanning is not feasible
in IPv6 world. This is only partially true. Network scanning is indeed not
feasible when the same techniques used for IPv4 networks are adopted. Sim-
ple brute force ping sweeps are not sufficient anymore. In IPv6 environment
there are two separate areas of considerations for network scanning, namely
local scanning and remote scanning.
28
IPv6 Attacks and Exploits Reconnaissance
Local scans remain still rather easy. The address space is too vast and
there are no broadcasts. Multicast can not be simply pinged as per [RFC4443].
This is, however, true for hosts compliant to it. It can be said about only one
from the two most widely used operating systems, Linux and Microsoft Win-
dows. Suprisingly, it is Microsoft Windows but they adopted [RFC4443]
with its exceptions as well and therefore the multicast can be successfully
pinged. More will be discussed in Section 6.3.8. Local reconnaissance can
be acomplished by other means as well. When an adversary has access to
LAN, they can perform passive discovery. It is possible to listen for messages
from DAD and ND mechanisms and collect IP addresses. Sometimes a few
addresses would be enough to discover the numbering pattern and selectively
ping the hosts.
Remote scans became more complicated but several ways to speed up
the scanning process exist. IPv6 addresses in the real world deployment are
mostly not random [23] [24] [RFC DRAFT1]. Numbering conventions often
used can be listed as follows.
SLAAC-based The“unknown”part of these addresses is really the lower 64
bits which are based on MAC address of the node. The construction is
outlined in Figure 6.1. First 24 bits are unique identifier of the vendor
of machine’s network interface card. These are known (e.g. for a virtual
infrastructure) or guessable using a dictionary of these values. Next 16
bits are constant and the truly unknown bits are the lowest 24 which
makes the scanning much faster.
Figure 6.1: Lower 64 bits of SLAAC-based IPv6 Address
IPv4-based These addresses are likely used in dual-stack environment and
contain IPv4 address in the IPv6 address. An exmaple could be
2001:db8::192:168:1:1. This makes the search space same as in case
of IPv4 environment.
“low byte(s)” Only the lower byte or two are used for host numbering. The
search space in this case is 28 or 216.
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“wordy” Wordy addresses such as 2001:db8::b00b:babe or
2001:db8::dead:beef are easy to remember but easy to guess as well.
Some kind “dictionary” scan can be utilized as well.
“service port” Addresses used on machines dedicated to a single service
often use easy to remember addresses such as 2001:db8::80 for web
server. This addressing scheme makes the search space as small as 28.
Another kind could be addresses provided by DHCP. Once one host is
found it would be easy to discover pattern of the DHCP pool but a speck of
luck is needed. When scanning is not suitable, an adversary will very likely
focus on DNS servers or particular types of traffic, such as e-mails, from
which the addresses can be extracted. If DNS is in use on a network, a kind
of dictionary attack may be utilized as there are common naming conventions
for servers such as capital cities, gods from greek mythology and so on.
6.2 Attacks Over IPv6
This section discusses attacks that exploit features of IPv6 itself. Embedded
ICMPv6 mechanisms are discussed in the next, separate and more compre-
hensive section.
6.2.1 Extension Headers Exploits
Extension headers seem to introduce a whole new attack domain to IPv6. Not
only they may cause concern about the performance of security systems that
have to process the headers correctly but security researchers have already
found several ways to exploit the extension headers.
Hop-by-Hop Options Header is the one and only extension header which
has strictly defined position in the IPv6 packet. It has to be placed right
after the IPv6 header and has to be present only once as it is the only exten-
sion header that is being inspected on every intermediate node. One of the
options that can be defined within Hop-by-Hop header is Router Alert Op-
tion which informs routers on the path that they should closely examine the
content as it could countain information valuable for them, such as RSVP or
MLD message [RFC 2711]. The option itself is specific Type-Length-Value
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(TLV) encoded number within Options field of the header as outlined in Fig-
ure 4.2. Unfortunately, this option can be exploited to cause DoS attack on a
router. Router spends more time examining content of packets with Router
Alert Options. Therefore, the situation when the router is flooded with large
number of these packets can lead to inadequate resources consumption or
deterioration of response time.
Extension headers are very useful when it comes to firewall evasion. Par-
ticular techniques described in [21], [22] and [26] will be discussed in detail
in Section 7.4.2 where additional firewall testing approach is described.
Another security solution which can be rather easily evaded using exten-
sion headers is Router Advertisement Guard (RA Guard) [27]. RA Guard is a
solution intended to protect against Router Advertisement attacks which will
be discussed in Section 6.3. All traffic on LAN has to pass through RA Guard
in order to make the protection effective. RA Guard can be a standalone so-
lution but it usually is additional functionality of switches. Assessing RA
Guard is out of the scope of this work.
Extension header threats are closely linked to fragmentation attacks be-
cause every fragment employs Fragment Header which is extension header
as well. Attacks associated to Fragment Header, respectively fragmentation
itself will be discussed in the following section.
6.2.2 Fragmentation Attacks
Fragmentation attacks are well known from IPv4 already but IPv6 changes
the fragmentation philosophy. Fragmentation can be perfomed exclusively
by the source host and not on intermediary nodes [RFC 2460]. This surely
benefits the ease of transmission but adversary can craft fragments more
accurately. Fragments can be used to bypass IDS/IPS systems as well as
firewalls. The techniques for hiding attack patterns or evading security sys-
tems are [25]:
• evasion - inserting fragment which is not processed by IDS/IPS but
let through due to its transparency,
• insertion - inserting fragment which is accepted by IDS/IPS but dis-
carded by a target host,
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• overlapping fragments - overlapping fragments could cause DoS dur-
ing reassembly or misinterpretation of the data thus hiding attack pat-
tern,
• tiny fragmentation - attempt to hide attack pattern; huge amount
of tiny fragments is a sign of a coming attack,
• disordered arrival of fragments - disordered fragmnents of several
packets arriving at once is a technique trying to avoid deep packet
inspection,
• fragment flooding - another strategy designated to avoid deep packet
inspection.
Handling of IPv6 fragments is described in [RFC 2460] and updated
by [RFC 5722]. All overlapping fragments should be silently discarded in-
cluding these not yet received. However, none of the current versions of
mainstream operating systems complies to these RFCs [25].
Figure 6.2: IPv6 Atomic Fragment
IPv6 introduces Fragment Header (structure outlined in Figure 4.6) which
is used to describe fragments and carries information needed for reassembly.
Together with this extension header is introduced so-called Atomic Fragment.
It is a packet that contains Fragment Header although it is not fragmented -
offset value and more bit is set to all zeroes, please refer to Figure 6.2. Atomic
Fragments may be exploited for security systems evasion. Handling of these
packet was standartized in May 2013 and overlapping fragments were ex-
plicitly forbidden in December 2009. Currently, there are some rummors in
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the IPv6 security community that IETF is trying to workout mechanism to
completely remove fragmentation from IPv6 because of its security concerns.
Moreover, incomplete stream of fragments may be exploited for amplifi-
cation or reflective DoS attacks. When systems are flooded with incomplete
fragments stream they wait for specified amount of time for the rest of the
stream to arrive. If the fragments do not arrive, host sends back ICMPv6
Time Exceeded (fragment reassembly time) message.
6.3 Attacks Over ICMPv6
As it has been already mentioned, ICMPv6 is a vital part of IPv6. It provides
for several handy features and replaces ARP utilized in IPv4. Unfortunately,
it also seems to be an Achilles’ heel of the whole protocol as many attacks
target it. Nevertheless, it has been always taken into account that the ad-
verasy needs access to LAN to exploit these ICMPv6 vulnerabilities. In most
cases, these threats have to be considered as an insider threats and public
LANs as networks of much higher risk.
Following sections of this chapter will discuss selected currently known
ICMPv6 vulnerabilities and associated exploits, sorted in random order.
6.3.1 Duplicate Address Detection Attack
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) is a mechanism employed by hosts and
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) feature of IPv6 to prevent du-
plicate addresses on a network. It is susceptible to Denial of Service (DoS)
attack.
When host is to join a network with address acquired, for example,
through SLAAC, it sends an ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message
to all nodes multicast address, FF02::1, in order to verify that there is no
host already in possession of this address. If there is no reply in specified
time, the hosts assumes the address is not in use and starts using it as its own
IPv6 address. This mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6.3 by steps (1), (2)
and (3).
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(1)
DST: FF02::1
Anyone has C?
(2)
no reply
(2)
no reply
Address A Address B
(3)
Address C
Figure 6.3: Proper Duplicate Address Detection
However, anyone can reply to NS message claiming that the particu-
lar address being solicitated is their address. When an adversary has ac-
cess to LAN, therefore is recipient of all nodes multicast messages, there is
nothing that could stop them from interrupting the DAD mechanism with
malicious activity. The principle is very simple. Anytime a host wants
to join the network and sends NS message to all nodes multicast address,
adversary responds claiming the address is theirs thus preventing any new
hosts from joining the network. The attack is summarized in Figure 6.4 by
steps (1), (2a), (2b) and (3).
(1)
DST: FF02::1
Anyone has C?
(2b)
no reply
(2a)
NA: I have C.
Address B
(3)
Address ?
Adversary
Address A
Figure 6.4: Duplicate Address Detection Attack
6.3.2 Router Advertisement Spoofing
Router Advertisement (RA) is a type of ICMPv6 message (Type 134) which
is periodically sent by a router in order to advertise itself and a particu-
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lar subnet settings to all nodes multicast address FF02::1. It can also be
request from the router by any node on the subnet by sending Router So-
licitation message to all routers multicast address FF02::2 (please refer to
Attachment I). Structure of a RA message is outlined in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: Format of Router Advertisement Message
It is obvious that RA messages can be arbitrary spoofed and thus ad-
versary can set any IP address as a default router and cause either Dos by
advertising bogus address or MITM by advertising their own, advertise var-
ious network prefixes, DNS servers and so on. Another way to cause DoS
is sending spoofed RA message which advertise the current router but with
Router Lifetime (see Figure 6.5) value set to zero. This will force all nodes
on the subnet to discard the default router. Lets look into the MITM attack
in more detail.
AdversaryVictim (1) Router Solicitation
DST: FF02::2
(2) Router Advertisement
(2) Router 
Advertisement
DST: FF02::1
Adversary
(1) Data
(2) Data
Figure 6.6: Proper Router Solicitiation/Advertisement Mechanism
Proper use of RS and RA messages is outlined in Figure 6.6. Host can re-
quest RA by sending RS message to all routers multicast address (1). Router
replies with requested RA message (2). Communication then takes place di-
rectly between hosts and the router (steps (1) and (2) in the lower scheme).
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However, anyone can send RA message and does not even have to wait for RS
request. Both solicitated and periodical advertisements can be overriden by
a forged advertisement with higher priority. When host receives the forged
RA message, it discards the previously advertised information and replaces
it with the one sent by an adversary.
AdversaryVictim (1) Router Solicitation
DST: FF02::2 (2) Router 
Advertisement
DST: FF02::1
AdversaryVictim
(1) Data
(2) Data
(3) Data
Figure 6.7: Man-in-the-Middle Attack with Spoofed Router Advertisement
The attack is outlined in Figure 6.7. The upper figure depicts attacker
answering RS with its own forged RA (2). The setup then opens door for
MITM attack for the adversary as all the traffic destined to router arrives
directly to them ( (2) on the lower scheme) as there can be only one default
gateway on the network. The adversary can modify or obtain private data,
hijack sessions and much more.
6.3.3 Router Advertisement Flooding
Another ICMPv6 flooding attacks is RA flooding (the message is outlined in
Figure 6.5). The principle is simple, and adversary floods whole network is
just particular host with forged RA messages. The attack can be performed
in number of slight modification. The messages can be simple advertisement
messages or messages bearing data, such as announcing new route. The
victim is overwhelmed by processing the information, resources are exhausted
and the situation leads to DoS.
Historically, there were bugs in several operating systems which made
this attack more serious. All major operating systems were vulnerable to
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RA flooding - Microsoft Windows 2003, 2008, XP, 7 and even Windows 8
were released with the same bug known from around year 2008; Linux,
Cisco IOS, Juniper Netscreen, FreeBSD and OS X [21] [22]. The systems
crashed, stopped responding or lost its connectivity. When the issue was
fixed, just simple modification of the RA message was enough to accom-
plish the same results [21] [22]. Currently, all the issues should be fixed by
the vendors. Microsoft fixed the issue in its operating systems in updates
released in April 2013, it is not necessary to reboot the system after RA at-
tack anymore. MS Windows does not respond during the attack as its CPU
utiliziation reaches 100% but it recovers when the flooding stops.
6.3.4 Neighbor Advertisement Spoofing
Neighbor Advertisement (NA) ICMPv6 Type 136 messages (with structure as
outlined in Figure 6.8) can be spoofed the very same way as RA messages in
Section 6.3.2 and the functionality of Neighbor Discovery is not very different
from the one of ARP in IPv4. It is obvious that it can be exploited to perform
MITM attack on LAN where an adversary can position themself into the
data stream between two communicating hosts. The principle of MITM
attack of solicitation/advertisement messages has been previously discussed
in Section 6.3.2.
Figure 6.8: Format of Neighbor Advertisement Message
If an adversary intends to perform MITM attack with forged NA mes-
sages, they do not have to wait for a solicitation request first. The mechanism
distinguishes between two kinds of NA messages, namely solicitated and un-
solicitated. These two differ in the value of Solicitated flag (represented as
S bit in Figure 6.8). Furthermore, an adversary can set Override flag (rep-
resented as O bit in Figure 6.8) that forces the target host to overwrite an
existing neighbor entry in its cache.
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Less sophisticated than use of forged NA messages for MITM is its use
for DoS attack. In this case, an adversary just passively monitors the traffic
for NS messages and answers every single one of them claiming to be the
host in question. It can be used to gather data or just to discard them and
cause DoS as the hosts would send data to the adversary and would not be
able to communicate between themselves.
6.3.5 Neighbor Solicitation Flooding
Another DoS attack is a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) flooding attack. NS mes-
sage is a Type 135 ICMPv6 message and it is properly used to obtain MAC
address when only IP address is known. Refer to Figure 6.9 for outline of the
message format. Host that needs to perform this kind of address resolution
send NS message to all nodes multicast address FF02::1. Host which is in
posession of said IP address responses with Neighbor Advertisement message
containing its MAC address.
Figure 6.9: Format of Neighbor Solicitation Message
When an adversary floods a victim with NS messages, it has to process
them all and appropriately response to each and single one of them. Scheme
of the attack is in Figure 6.10. The flooding leads to resources exhaustion
and therefore to DoS situation. All major operating systems are vulnerable
to this type of attack [21] including Microsoft Windows 7. The attacks do
not affect the source of the flood.
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AdversaryVictim
Neighbor SolicitationNeighbor Advertisement
DST: Adversary
SRC: Victim
Data: MAC Address
DST: FF02::1
SRC: Adversary
Who has Victim’s IP?
Figure 6.10: Scheme of Neighbor Solicitation Flooding Attack
6.3.6 Link Deterioration
Another DoS attack which, however, is not very effective exploits ICMPv6
Packet Too Big messages. Proper use of the messages is to negotiate Max-
imum Transmission Unit (MTU) of a path. This mechanism is essential for
IPv6 because fregmentation on the intermediary nodes is forbidden.
During the attack adversary repeatedly sends illegitimate ICMPv6 Packet
Too Big messages to a router and therefore reduces MTU of a link to the
minimum of 1280 octets. Consequently, the link is not utilized up to its
capacity. The attack is schematically outlined in Figure 6.11.
Adversary
Victim A Victim BInternet
ICMPv6
Packet Too Big
Figure 6.11: Scheme of Link Deterioration Attack
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6.3.7 Secure Neighbor Discovery Flooding
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) mechanism is discussed in section 4.2.2.
It was developed as a countermeasure to several Neigbor Discovery and
Router Advertisement threats, most of which are discussed earlier in this
chapter. It introduces new Options which employs CGA signing to authen-
ticate messages. However, no wide deployment of SEND is expected because
it requires implementation of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which is not
trivial and key distribution would cause traffic overhead. Moreover, DoS at-
tack targets SEND. It is a simple flooding attack when adversary sends many,
for example, Neighbor Soliciation messages signed with bogus CGA Options.
Every host on the network receives the messages as it is sent to all nodes
multicast address FF02::1. Cryptographic CGA verification steals a lot of
CPU time and causes DoS attack. The attack is illustrated in Figure 6.12.
AdversaryVictim A Victim B
ICMPv6
SRC: Adversary
DST: FF02::1
Options: CGA fake signing
SEND NS
Messages
Figure 6.12: Scheme of Secure Neighbor Discovery Flooding
6.3.8 Smurf Attack
Smurf attack which should be called multicast amplification attack in IPv6
environment is described in Section 4.1.2. It is mentioned there that the
attack should be no issue in environment with nodes compliant to [RFC4443]
which forbids responding to ICMPv6 messages with any multicast address as
a destination. At the same time, it defines two exceptions. One is ICMPv6
Packet Too Big Message (Type 2) which is sent by a router when the packet
is larger than MTU of the link leading to destination. Second is any ICMPv6
message with invalid option value which makes every node registered with
the multicast address respond with ICMPv6 Parameter Problem error reply.
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However, the current state is that MS Windows operating systems are
compliant to [RFC4443] and attempt to smurf them is degraded to ICMPv6
Echo Request flooding as they do not respond. The flooding leads to in-
creased resources consumption and it can lead to Dos in an extreme case.
On the other hand, Linux distributions are known for its non-compliance
to [RFC4443] and are vulnerable to smurf attacks and even remote smurf
attack can be accomplished due to a flaw in stack implementation [22].
6.4 Implementation Maturity Problems
Before IPv6 functionality is introduced in any security system, developers
have to write new kernel (core) from scratch. It is not just about parsing the
new protocol structures correctly but also about getting the right context
from doing so.
All vendors have come trhough this when developing appliances for IPv4
and many mistakes were made (one example for all - legendary Ping of
Death). The situation nowadays with IPv6 seems similar to the one of IPv4
in the early days as many bugs and flaws emerge in the IPv6 functionalities
of current systems.
One way to measure the maturity of IPv6 implementations could be
through Common Vulnerabilites and Exposures database.
6.4.1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database maintains list of
all kinds of discovered security issues within commonly used products, both
hardware and software. Every commonly known information security issue
is assigned an unique identifier. Approximately twice as many IPv6 than
IPv4 issues is registered every year [21]. This fact may be surprising if one
compares the extent of current IPv4 and IPv6 deployment. Currently, there
is 142 registered IPv6 associated vulnerabilities in the database of which 7
were registered in 2013 (state as of 1st June 2013) and certainly, there is no
guarantee that all issues were registered. Just to mention a few of the vendors
or products on the list, in random order: Cisco IOS, Microsoft, Mozilla
Firefox, Juniper, IBM, Sun Solaris, Kaspersky Labs and Linux Kernel.
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These issues are generally found when the product is placed in real-world
production environment. It is obviously the most effective testing approach
but definitely not the right one. Fuzzing is a technique known mainly from
web application testing. It is an effort to find a bug in the application by
generating variety of input values, mostly just bogus. Adversary then exploits
the flaw for malicious purposes such as injection attacks or just crashing
down the application. There are several tools available for IPv6 and ICMPv6
packets fuzzing and even more sophisticated implementation checkers.
42
7 IDS/IPS Security Assessment
The reasons why IPv6 testing of the IPv6 capable solutions is necessary is
explained in Section 5.2. Basic guidelines for testing of IDS/IPS solutions are
set up in this chapter. One physical appliance (unlike original intentions, see
Section 7.5) is then tested in compliance to these guidelines and the results
evaluated therein. It builds on the attacks description from previous chapter.
7.1 Appliance Selection
Two types of IDS/IPS appliance were available for testing. Both will be used
in the experimental simulations in this chapter. However, the testing shall
be applicable to appliances from any other vendor as well.
First is a software appliance which is designed to be employed in a virtual
infrastructure on VMware platform. Virtual IPS is characterised by minimal
requirements and technical specifications as described in Table 7.1.
Processor 2x Quad Core @ 2.83GHz
Memory 1 GB RAM
Disk Space 10 GB HDD
Operating System VMware ESX Infrastructure 3 version 3.5
Throughput Up to 700 Mbps
Segment(s) 1
Connections per second 19 000
Max. number of connections 500 000
Table 7.1: Virtual IPS Specification
Second is a hardware based, stand-alone appliance Network IPS. Its tech-
nical and performance specification is summarized in Table 7.2.
Both of these appliances utilize current firmware, namely version 0.0,
and have been updated with latest signature update package. Every update
package consists of currently released signatures which should be always in-
stalled upon release. Therefore, both appliances possess the same IDS/IPS
capabilities. It is possible to manage these appliances through centralized
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Inspected Throughput 800 Mbps
Interfaces (Segments) 4 (2)
Connections per second 35 000
Max. number of connections 1 300 000
Latency < 150µs
Table 7.2: Network IPS Specification
management system, a solution primarily intended for centralized adminis-
tration of multiple appliances. This is, however, optional and both appliances
can be managed locally through management console port.
The management console on the physical appliance is accessible via Eth-
ernet cable with RJ45 connector. The appliance has assigned address from
169.254.0.0/16 subnet as per [RFC 3927] and the Java-based web interface
can be accessed via a web browser. Supported operating systems (OS) are
• Microsoft Windows XP,
• Microsoft Windows Vista,
• Microsoft Windows 7
with one of the following browsers
• Microsoft Internet Explorer 8,
• Microsoft Internet Explorer 9,
• Mozilla Firefox 13
and with Java Runtime Environment (JRE) Sun 1.6.x or IBM 1.6.x.
For the virtual appliance, it is possible to access the web interface via the
same browsers and OS as mentioned above. The only difference is that the
link is virtual and has to be established within the virtual infrastucture.
The experiments will zero in on the signature-based detection mechanism.
The signatures in these appliances should cover anomalies from RFC-defined
standards as well and there is no IPv6 network available for the purpose of
this work where it could be possible to establish a reasonable baseline for
behavior-based detection.
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7.2 Testing Tools
Very popular linux distribution which by default contains several penetration
testing tools used both by professional and enthusiast security personnel is
Kali Linux (formerly known as Backtrack). Kali Linux is a Debian-based
distribution developed by Offensive Security which is claimed to be“the most
advanced penetration testing distribution, ever” [20]. It is used as a base for
the purpose of this thesis, particularly version 1.0.1.
There are tons of useful tools integrated directly in the Kali Linux. How-
ever, only one toolkit focuses solely on assesing IPv6. THC-IPv6 Attack
Toolkit is very comprehensive suite consisting of tens of adaptable tools.
Several implementation bugs and vulnerabilites have been discovered with
help of this toolkit; lets mention current vulnerability in handling extension
headers which causes crash of Kaspersky Lab’s personal firewall [17], similar
crash of Aventail Personal Firewall 2012 [21] or ways to bypass security in
some Cisco or Zyxel products [21]. The source code comes with easy-to-use
library written in C programming language. When being compiled from the
source code, library libssl-dev is required to be present on the system.
Very similar but not as comprehensive toolkit as the one from THC is be-
ing developed by SI6 Networks. It consists of rather smaller number of tools
where most of the functionalities are the same but it posses extended recon-
naissance features. Nevertheless, the toolkit is not integrated into the Kali
Linux and may be obtained from the project’s Git repository [18]. Additional
package libcap0.8-dev has to be installed prior compilation.
Where better granularity for packet crafting is needed, tool Scapy comes
in handy. Scapy is a packet manipulation tool, which can be used to craft
specific packets, send or sniff traffic. Whole tools can be based on Scapy,
which is interactive python application. Package python-gnuplot should be
installed for smooth run of the application. Additionally, package python-
sphinx may be needed in order to generate documentation.
Not only security of the IPv6 protocol itself should be focused on dur-
ing the testing. As it has been already discussed in this work, immaturity
of IPv6 implementations can cause a security threats as well. Both of the
above mentioned toolkits contain fuzzers which generate all possible valid
and invalid combinations of options in packets. For higher level of assurance,
additional tool for assesment of IPv6 stacks will be used in this work. ISIC,
IP Stack Integrity Checker, contains tools designated for IPv6 as well as IPv4.
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It can be obtained from [19] and needs package libnet1-dev to be installed
prior compilation. Utlizing ISIC, researchers have found bugs for example in
Checkpoint Firewall [19].
Fully updated (as of the submission date of this work) Kali Linux Vir-
tualBox image (.vdi) with all the above-mentioned tools and their source
codes is attached to this thesis. It contains prescripted easy-to-use test cases
from the following chapter as well.
7.3 Test Cases
This section will list and describe selected attacks and techniques which will
then be used for the testing purposes. It also describes the evaluation ap-
proach and scale. The appliance is tested as a grey box, with access to settings
and management console but without knowledge of the content of particular
signatures and details about packets processing. The testing setup is outlined
in Figure 7.1.
IDS/IPS
Appliance
Source Destination
Traffic Analyzer Traffic Analyzer
Figure 7.1: Testing Setup Scheme
Every attack scenario, from now on called a test case (TC), is assigned
a code and a short, characteristic description which will be used in results
summary. Following is more detailed description, which is based on the
previous Chapter 6 - IPv6 Attacks and Exploits.
Description of the IDS/IPS test cases follows. The list does not cover
all possible attacks but should suffice for the character of the appliance and
purpose of this work. Other findigs, if any, will be discussed in Section 7.5.1.
SCAN-LOC - Local Hosts Scaninng Local network scan exploiting the
exception in [RFC 4443] as described in 6.1.1 and 6.3.8.
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SCAN-REM - Remote Hosts Scanning Remote network scan utilizing
classical ping sweeps and speeding up tehniques as described in 6.1.1.
FL1-RA - Router Advertisement Flooding RA flooding as described
in Section 6.3.3. Two types of the attack will be examined, first flooding
simple RA messages and second flooding RA messages with random
route entries.
FL2-NS - Neighbor Solicitation Flooding Flooding with NS messages
as described in Section 6.3.5. Again two types of the attack will be
examined, first targeting whole network and second targeting just par-
ticular host.
FL3-CGA - Secure Neighbor Discovery Flooding SEND attack exactly
as described in Section 6.3.7.
RH0 - Handling of Routing Header Type 0 This test case will assess
handling of packets with RH0. Packets with this kind of extension
header are depreciated as per [RFC 5095].
FRAG - Fragmentation Handling The fragments processing should be
examined as much as possible in this test case. If not known, it should
be reversly engineered to fully understand how the IDS/IPS appliance
handles fragmented traffic.
CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures It is necessary to test
as much CVEs as possible. There is currently tool in the THC-IPv6
Attack toolkit tool exploit6 covering four of them.
FUZZ-IPv6 - IPv6 Fuzzing Fuzzing to assess the correctness and robust-
ness of IPv6 stack implementation. Possible flaws would be very likely
found during this test.
FUZZ-ICMPv6 - ICMPv6 Fuzzing Fuzzing to assess the correctness and
robustness of ICMPv6 implementation. Possible flaws would be very
likely found during this test.
The results will be evaluated according to the following scale in order
to maintain uniformity and to provide baseline for benchmarking in case of
reuse of these guidelines on another solution.
Passed. Appliance reacted appropriately without significantly increased re-
sources consumption. Expected actions have been taken where aplica-
ble.
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Passed, but Findings Noted. Overall performace of the appliance has
been satisfactory, however, exceptions were observed; including, but
certainly not limited to inadequate resources consumption, temporary
instability or inaccurate processing.
Failed. Appliance crashed, did not detect any event or behaved in unex-
pected and/or unreasonable manner.
For the latter two, detailed explanation and description of symptoms is
necessary. It will be attached to the resulting assessment summary. Expla-
nation for “Passed.” result is optional.
7.4 Additional Testing
According to system-specific features or deployment-specific requirements,
additional testing should be considered. The more is being tested, the higher
level of assurance can be achieved.
In this case, both appliances Network IPS and Virtual IPS with firmware
0. has integrated functionality of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) inspection
and a firewall. Both functionalities will be assessed.
However, another reason behind this additional testing within this work
is that originally intended performance comparison of the physical and vir-
tual appliance was not possible because of the reason mentioned later in
Section 7.5 - Test Results.
7.4.1 Data Loss Prevention
DLP is a very broad concept which is completely out of the scope of this work
and the additional DLP functionality of the examined appliance is definitely
not a complete solution. In a nutshell, goal of DLP is to prevent sensitive
data leakage. From its perspective, data belong into three categories:
• data in use - data being used by users, data in production environment;
• data in rest - archived data;
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• data in motion - data on a network.
It is clear that data in motion will be the focus. The goal is to prevent data
which conform to specific patterns from leaveing company’s logical bound-
aries. The appliance is able to inspect data on the higher layers of ISO/OSI
model which has been proofed in practice. This work will challenge Layer 3
inspection by utilizing known covert channels in the IPv6 protocol.
Almost every field in IPv6 packet can be used to hide data [22]. The
first one to come up to one’s mind is Options field in some of the extension
headers. It can be used to smuggle data from the company’s premises over the
Internet to desired destination. When sent in plaintext, it could be detected
by DLP systems but becomes undetectable by pattern matching with added
encryption. Figure 7.2 illustrates the idea behind the misconduct.
Company
DLP Appliance
Internet
Employee’s
Home PCBusiness Value Data
Disgruntled
Employee
Figure 7.2: Smuggling Data Via IPv6 Covert Channels
7.4.2 Firewall
The integrated firewall supports IPv6 rules and current IPv6 firewalls are,
unfortunately, well know for several flaws which provide channels for appro-
priate evasion techniques. Tool firewall6 from The Hacker’s Choice IPv6
toolkit is the most sophisticated, broadly used tool to perform firewall testing.
The tools sends many different types of SYN packets.
For the purpose of this work, all traffic destined to SSH port 22 on both
TCP and UDP via IPv6 only was being blocked by the integrated firewall.
Wireshark was run on the target as well as source hosts so detailed analysis
of the traffic could be performed.
Individual test cases can be described as follows.
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FW1 - Plain Sending Sends a plain, basic SYN packet to mak sure the
port is blocked.
FW2 - Plain Sending with Data Same as FW1 but with additional data.
FW3 - IPv4 Ethernet Type Type field at Layer 2 is erroneously set to
IPv4 value. This could bypass the IPv6 rule via IPv4 stack if decisions
are made based only on Layer 2 information.
FW4 - Hop-by-Hop Hdr, Ignore Option Hop-by-Hop Options Header
is added to the SYN packet but has total length of 8 bytes, Options
fields is all zeroes. This packet should be processed the same way as a
packet without any extension header.
FW5 - Destination Hdr, Ignore Option In this case, Destination Op-
tions Header is used the same way as in FW4. The header should have
no effect on processing. Format of Destination Options Header is illus-
trated in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Format of Destination Options Header
FW6 - Hop-by-Hop Hdr, Router Alert Packet contains Hop-by-Hop Op-
tions Header with Router Alert Option. The option is described in
detail in Section 6.2.1.
FW7 - 3x Destination Hdr, Ignore Option This packet contains three
Destination Options Headers and the impact should be as mentioned
for test case FW5.
FW8 - 130x Destination Hdr, Ignore Option Same as FW7, resp. FW5
but the number of headers increases to 130. Some devices may be able
to process only limited number of extension headers.
FW9 - Atomic Fragment Packet which contains Fragment Header although
it is not fragmented is considered as atomic fragment. IETF standard
regarding handling of atomic fragments has been adopted very recently,
in May 2013 [RFC 6946].
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FW10 - 2x Atomic Fragment, Same ID
FW11 - 2x Atomic Fragment, Different ID
FW12 - 3x Atomic Fragment, Same ID
FW13 - 3x Atomic Fragment, Different ID
FW14 - 130x Atomic Fragment, Same ID
FW15 - 130x Atomic Fragment, Different ID
FW16 - 260x Atomic Fragment, Same ID
FW17 - 260x Atomic Fragment, Different ID
All these test cases (FW11 - FW17) are variation of FW9. They differ in
number of Fragment Headers and the Fragment Headers within one
packet have either same or different Identification value which is 32-bit
within the header as illustrated in Figure 4.6. It is a packet identifica-
tion value needed for the packet reassembly.
FW18 - 2KB Destination Hdr The packet contains Destination Options
Header which has so many options so it has to be fragmented. This
could cause firewall to crash.
FW19 - 2KB Destination Hdr+Destination Hdr Extension of test case
FW18. One regular Destination Options Header is added.
FW20 - 32x 2KB Destination Hdr Another extension of test case FW18.
The number of headers extends to 32 and it takes 35 fragments to
transmit this packet.
FW21 - 2x Destination Hdr+2x Fragment Hdr Packet containing com-
bination of two Destination Options Headers and two Fragment Header.
This test case targets extension headers processing.
FW22 - 4x Destination Hdr+3x Fragment Hdr Packet with combina-
tion of four Destination Options Headers and three Fragment Header.
It targets possible flaws in processing of extension headers.
FW23 - Fragmentation “first+middle” Only the first two fragments out
of three have Next Header value defined to TCP.
FW24 - Fragmentation “first(second)” Next Header of first fragment is
set to ICMPv6, the second to TCP.
FW25 - Fragmentation “first#2(overlap)” First two fragments overlap.
Fragments are filled with Destination Options Headers.
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FW26 - Fragmentation “first#3(resend#2)” After first fragment with
bogus data is sent the whole packet is then resent as an atomic fragment
with the same Identification (ID).
FW27 - Fragmentation “first#4(resend#2L)” First fragment is sent
and the whole packet is then resent as an atomic fragment with the
same Identification (ID).
FW28 - Fragmentation “middle+last” The packet is sent in three frag-
ments. Next Header value of the last two is set to TCP, first one to
ICMPv6.
FW29 - Fragmentation “middle(first)+last” The three fragments are
sent in the following order: middle, first, last. Only middle and last ones
have Next Header value set to TCP. The first one is sent to ICMPv6.
FW30 - Fragmentation “last” Only the last one out of three fragments
has the Next Header value set to TCP. The value of first two is set to
ICMPv6.
FW31 - Plain Sending, Variable Source Ports Sends the packet in plain
format but with various source ports.
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7.5 Test Results
This chapter contains summarized results of all the test specified in the pre-
ceding chapter, clearly divided into sections. Subsequent chapter, Section 7.6,
is all in all verbal evaluation of the appliance.
Unfortunately, unlike original intention, results of testing of only the
Network IPS physical appliance will be presented herein. The underlying
VMware ESXi 4.1.0 had crashed during the testing of Virtual IPS and be-
haved unexpectedly, therefore the results would not be reliable. The scenario
and collected evidence was passed on to VMware, Inc. customer support and
author of this work reserves right to not to disclose any details about this
incident before a statement of the company is given.
7.5.1 IDS/IPS Assessment
Test results are summarized in Table 7.3. Detailed explanation of the results
and other findigs follows.
Test Case Description Result
SCAN-LOC Local Network Scanning Failed.
SCAN-REM Remote Network Scanning Passed.
FL1-RA Router Advertisement Flooding Failed.
FL2-NS Neighbor Solicitation Flooding Failed.
FL3-CGA Secure Neighbor Discovery Flooding Failed.
RH0 Handling of Routing Header Type 0 Failed.
FRAG Fragmentation Handling
Passed,
but Exceptions Noted.
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Passed,
but Exceptions Noted.
FUZZ-IPv6 IPv6 Fuzzing Passed.
FUZZ-ICMPv6 ICMPv6 Fuzzing Passed.
Table 7.3: Network IPS General IPv6 Assessment Results
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SCAN-LOC - Local Hosts Scaninng The appliance did not detect at-
tempt to ping all nodes multicats address FF02::1 with ICMPv6 Echo
Request with invalid option. ICMPv6 Parameter Problem message was
successfully received. The appliance should discover malformed packet
without any known benign use. All deviations from RFC defined states
should be discovered and alerted at least.
SCAN-REM - Remote Hosts Scanning This attack is actually only se-
lective ping sweep network scan. When defined threshold is exceeded,
the scan is blocked.
FL1-RA - Router Advertisement Flooding
FL2-NA - Neighbor Solicitation Flooding
FL3-CGA - Secure Neighbor Discovery Flooding
The tested appliance does not block flooding with any of these IPv6
specific messages. No more testing of flooding attacks was not neces-
sary as reasonable assurance was obtained. This will be reported to
the vendor as a suggested crucial area for improvement.
RH0 - Handling of Routing Header Type 0 The appliance let through
packets containig RH0 extension header. Use of this header is depreci-
ated due to its severe security concern and therefore there is no bening
use. These packets should definitely be blocked.
FRAG - Fragmentation Handling There have been findings noted in the
fragments processing. The appliance does not reassemble the whole
packet but compares only nth and (n − 1)th packet to detect overlap-
ping and only the rest of the stream is dropped after an anomaly had
been found. The preceding, valid fragments are let through. This may
be sufficient for detecting spot anomalies but certainly not enough to
get the right context. Fragmented packets bigger than maximum MTU
are let through although it may be attempt to accomplish buffer over-
flow. The appliance correctly drops badly chained fragments and final
fragments with empty payload. However, it does not drop fragments
which are smaller that minimal MTU (1280 octets) and are not the last
fragment in a particular stream. Atomic fragmets, even with several
Fragment Headers, are let through as well.
CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Three out of four ex-
ploits were blocked. The one that was let through is CVE-2003-0429.
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FUZZ-IPv6 - IPv6 Fuzzing
FUZZ-ICMPv6 - ICMPv6 Fuzzing
The stack implementation is very robust. There was no crash or in-
stability during the fuzzing. Moreover, several signatures reporting
malformed packets triggered alerts.
Following is a list of other findings noted during the testing.
• The appliance does not evaluate hop limit value, packets the value
set to ‘1” are let through. This can be exploited to reflect ICMPv6
Time Exceeded (hop limit exceeded in transit) messages and consume
resources of a router behind the IDS/IPS appliance.
• Packets with invalid checksum value are dropped but no alert is raised.
• Any packet with invalid use of Hop-by-Hop header is dropped and
proper alert is raised.
• The appliance successfully detects some of the currently known firewall
evasion techniques.
7.5.2 Data Loss Prevention
DLP rule looking for e-mail addresses within traffic was defined. The data
can be sent using tool covert_send6 from THC-IPv6 Attack Toolkit or by
custom Scapy script. Both test cases have the same result - data were suc-
cessfully transmited through the appliance.
It can be concluded that DLP inspection takes place only on higher layers
of ISO/OSI model and not on the Layer 3. Needless to mention what the
result was when encryption was employed. Figure 7.4 shows e-mail addresses
hidden within the Destination Options header of ICMPv6 Echo Request mes-
sage as seen in Wireshark on the target host.
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Figure 7.4: E-mail Addresses Hidden Within Destination Options Header
7.5.3 Firewall
Testing of the appliance was performed in two rounds. During the first round,
IDS/IPS IPv6 signatures were enabled whilst during the second round were
deactivated. The results are summarized in Table 7.4.
The results are divided into two columns, one for each round. Blocked
means that the packet was not allowed through the appliance, Let Through
then means that it traversed the appliance. In all cases when the packet
passed the appliance, TCP SYN-ACK packet was received by the source host.
It is obvious that bypass the firewall does not require much effort. Unfor-
tunately, the situation is not very different among other vendors [21] [22] [26]
and it is necessary to mention that the firewall is not a primary function
of the appliance. However, it is interesting, if not shocking, that the fire-
wall is vulnerable to the same evasion techniques that are detectable by the
IDS/IPS engine. Concretely, test cases FW16, FW17, FW21 and FW22 triggered
alert through signature Firewall_Bypass.
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Test Description Firewall&IPS Firewall Only
FW1 Plain Sending Blocked Blocked
FW2 Plain Sending with Data Blocked Blocked
FW3 IPv4 Ethernet Type Blocked Blocked
FW4 Hop-by-Hop Hdr, Ignore Option Blocked Blocked
FW5 Destination Hdr, Ignore Option Blocked Blocked
FW6 Hop-by-Hop Hdr, Router Alert Blocked Blocked
FW7 3x Destination Hdr, Ignore Option Blocked Blocked
FW8 130x Destination Hdr, Ignore Option Blocked Blocked
FW9 Atomic Fragment Let Through Let Through
FW10 2x Atomic Fragment, Same ID Let Through Let Through
FW11 2x Atomic Fragment, Different ID Let Through Let Through
FW12 3x Atomic Fragment, Same ID Let Through Let Through
FW13 3x Atomic Fragment, Different ID Let Through Let Through
FW14 130x Atomic Fragment, Same ID Let Through Let Through
FW15 130x Atomic Fragment, Different ID Let Through Let Through
FW16 260x Atomic Fragment, Same ID Blocked Let Through
FW17 260x Atomic Fragment, Different ID Blocked Let Through
FW18 2KB Destination Hdr Blocked Blocked
FW19 2KB Destination Hdr+Destination Hdr Blocked Blocked
FW20 32x 2KB Destination Hdr Blocked Blocked
FW21 2x Destination Hdr+2x Fragment Hdr Blocked Let Through
FW22 4x Destination Hdr+3x Fragment Hdr Blocked Let Through
FW23 Fragmentation “first+middle” Blocked Blocked
FW24 Fragmentation “first(second)” Blocked Blocked
FW25 Fragmentation “first#2(overlap)” Blocked Blocked
FW26 Fragmentation “first#3(resend#2)” Let Through Let Through
FW27 Fragmentation “first#4(resend#2L)” Blocked Blocked
FW28 Fragmentation “middle+last” Blocked Blocked
FW29 Fragmentation “middle(first)+last” Blocked Blocked
FW30 Fragmentation “last” Blocked Blocked
FW31 Plain Sending, Variable Source Ports Blocked Blocked
Table 7.4: Network IPS Firewall Assessment Results
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7.6 Assessment Conclusion
The overall results as presented in previous chapters are not very satisfactory.
This chapter will discuss other aspects of tested appliance and suggest ways
to achieve higher level of protection. It is necessary to mention that there has
been no market-driven demand for complex IPv6 support so far in general
and this work does not intend to cast a bad light on the tested appliance.
Network IPS as a general system of active protection is positioned into
vendors portfolio where it supports other products so they can create complex
security solutions together. Its versatility, on the other hand, may represent
a certain disadvantage in highly specialized areas. The appliance supports
variety of protocols spanning several areas of networking and provides protec-
tion against numerous threats but it is specificaly focused on threats linked
with application layer. These threats endanger aplication, web and database
servers where, in extreme case, one maliciously crafted packet can cause
harm. Without an appropriate protection, these attacks are often discovered
when it is too late. Network IPS provides an early protection against this
type of attacks and its detection engine utilizes algorithms rather then signa-
tures to protect against all possible attack modifications where simple search
for patterns would be inadequate.
Valuable functionality of the appliance is protection against worms. It
well accompanies antimalware software on hosts because network worms are
usually not planted in a file system and therefore are undetectable by com-
mon host-based solutions. Network IPS is more than appropriate protection
againts worm-like malware.
Several attacks may be detectable by flow analysis. Version 0.0 of Net-
work IPS firmware can generate flow reports. However, it can not analyze
the reports but rather export them to external collectors. Vendor offers a
complemetary solution to IDS/IPS appliances, Flow Collector, which posses
such functionality. With advanced flow analysis, both solutions together can
provide high level of protection againts flooding attacks, even the skillfully
modified ones.
Another interesting fact is that vendor collects real data feedback through
its more than 0000 customers worldwide. Vendors security research team then
has means to search for and protect against zero-day exploits and they have
the best and undistorted testing environment - real world data.
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8 Epilogue
The goal of this work was to gather knowledge of IPv6 security and related
threats, then look into this area from perspective of current IDS/IPS solutions
and afterwards transform the gained knowledge into practical guidelines how
to assess usability of these systems.
The first part of this work contains comprehensive and up-to-date com-
parison of IPv4 and IPv6 related threats with references to corresponding
RFCs. This part may be useful as a reference for future work. However, any
such potential work should take into account that IPv6 is very dynamic and
still developing technology. In fact, some of the information may become
outdated in a couple of months.
The second part focused on particular attacks and IDS/IPS appliance
assessment. I see the main contribution of this work in desciption of the
selected attacks. Eventhough several ready-to-use tools for penetration test-
ing exist, none of them comes with any kind of documentation. Original
intention was to test physical and virtual appliance with same firmware and
compare performace results. However, issue in the VMware virtual infras-
tructure was found during the testing so I decided, after consultation with
the thesis supervisor, to scratch the results as untrustworthy. Testing of addi-
tional functionalities of the physical appliance was performed as a subtitute.
The overall results of the assessment are unsatisfactory. It is necessary
to mention that the situation among the majority of other vendors is very
similar. I strongly believe that such testing will help to improve IPv6 ca-
pabilities and hopefully even the protocol itself. There is a wide range of
possibilities for future work as well as challenges in the area of IPv6 security.
The most current one would be transition mechanisms from IPv4 to IPv6 and
its coexistence. Further development of testing tools and testc cases would
be advisable as well.
In conclusion, it can not be decided whether IPv6 is by design more secure
than IPv4. It is just different, maybe more different than many expected.
Wider deployment or testing of IPv6 capable solutions in real-world scenarios
would help to break the barrier and market demand would drive vendors to
provide better IPv6 support and consequently the technology would be more
trusted.
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A List of Abbreviations
ACL Access List
AH Authentication Header
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
BU Binding Update
CGA Cryptographically Generated Addresses
CN Correspondent Node
CoA Care-of Address
CPU Central Processing Unit
DAD Duplicate Address Detection
DLP Data Loss Prevention
DoS Denial of Service
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Services
DST Destination
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
HA Home Agent
HDR Header
HIDS Host Intrusion Detection System
HIPS Host Intrusion Prevention System
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HoA Home Address
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICMPv6 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
IS-IS Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System
ISIC IP Stack Integrity Checker
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List of Abbreviations
ISO/OSI International Standards Organization/Open Systems Interconnection
ISP Internet Service Provider
JRE Java Runtime Environment
LAN Local Area Network
LMI Local Management Interface
MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm 5
MIPv6 Mobile Internet Protocol version 6
MITM Man-in-the-middle
MLD Multicast Listener Discovery
MN Mobile Node
MTU Maximum Transmission Unit
NA Neighbor Advertisment
NAT Network Address Translation
NDP Neighbor Discovery Protocol
NUD Neighbor Unreachability Detection
NIDS Network Intrusion Detection System
NIPS Network Intrusion Prevention System
NS Neighbor Solicitation
OS Operating System
OSPFv3 Open Shortest Path First version 3
PMTU Path Maximum Transmission Unit
PMTUD Path Maximum Transmission Unit Discovery
QoS Quality of Services
RA Router Advertisement
RFC Request for Comments
RH Routing Header
RH0 Routing Header Type 0
RIPng Routing Information Protocol Next-Generation
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman Algorithm
RSVP Resources Reservation Protocol
SA Security Association
SEND Secure Neighbor Discovery
SLAAC Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
SRC Source
SSH Secure Shell
TC Test Case
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
THC The Hacker’s Choice
TLV Type-Length-Value
UDP User Datagram Protocol
WAP Wireless Access Point
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C Attachment I - Multicasts
Node-, Link- and Site-local multicast addresses registered by IANA [15] as
of February 2013.
Node-Local Scope Multicast Addresses
Address Description
FF01:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 All Nodes Address
FF01:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 All Routers Address
FF01:0:0:0:0:0:0:FB mDNSv6
Link-Local Scope Multicast Addresses
Address Description
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 All Nodes Address
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 All Routers Address
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:3 Unassigned
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:4 DVMRP Routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:5 OSPFIGP
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:6 OSPFIGP Designated Routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:7 ST Routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:8 ST Hosts
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:9 RIP Routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:A EIGRP Routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:B Mobile-Agents
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:C SSDP
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:D All PIM Routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:E RSVP-ENCAPSULATION
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:F UPnP
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:10 All-BBF-Access-Nodes
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:12 VRRP
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:16 All MLDv2-capable routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:1A all-RPL-nodes
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Address Description
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:6A All-Snoopers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:6B PTP-pdelay
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:6C Saratoga
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:6D LL-MANET-Routers
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:6E IGRS
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:6F iADT Discovery
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:FB mDNSv6
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:1:1 Link Name
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:1:2 All-dhcp-agents
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:1:3 Link-local Multicast Name Resolution
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:1:4 DTCP Announcement
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:1:5 afore vdp
FF02:0:0:0:0:0:1:6 Babel
FF02::1:FF00:0000/104 Solicited-Node Address
FF02:0:0:0:0:2:FF00::/104 Node Information Queries
Site-Local Scope Multicast Addresses
FF05:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 All Routers Address
FF05:0:0:0:0:0:0:FB mDNSv6
FF05:0:0:0:0:0:1:3 All-dhcp-servers
FF05:0:0:0:0:0:1:4 Deprecated (2003-03-12)
FF05:0:0:0:0:0:1:5 SL-MANET-ROUTERS
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ICMPv6 filtering recommendations as defined in [RFC 4890].
Must - must be dropped; Must Not - must not be dropped; Policy De-
fined - policy should be defined; Should - should be dropped unless a good
case can be made; Should Not - normally should not be dropped; Will -
will be dropped anyway, no special attention needed.
Type Message / Description Transit Traffic Local Traffic
1 Destination Unreachable Must Not Must Not
2 Packet Too Big Must Not Must Not
3 Time Exceeded Must Not Must Not
3-Code 1 Time Exceeded Should Not Should Not
4 Parameter Problem Must Not Must Not
4-Code 0 Parameter Problem Should Not Should Not
5 - 99 Unallocated Error messages Policy Defined Policy Defined
100 - 101 Experiment Should Should
102 - 126 Unallocated Error messages Policy Defined Policy Defined
127 Extension Should Should
128 Echo Request Must Not Must Not
129 Echo Response Must Not Must Not
130 Listener Query Will Must Not
131 Listener Report Will Must Not
132 Listener Done Will Must Not
133 Router Solicitation Will Must Not
134 Router Advertisement Will Must Not
135 Neighbor Solicitation Will Must Not
136 Neighbor Advertisement Will Must Not
137 Redirect Will Policy Defined
138 Router Renumbering Should Will
139 Node Information Query Should Policy Defined
140 Node Information Response Should Policy Defined
141 Inverse ND Solicitation Will Must Not
142 Inverse ND Advertisement Will Must Not
143 Listener Report v2 Will Must Not
144 HA Address Discovery Request Should Not Will
145 HA Address Discovery Reply Should Not Will
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Type Message / Description Transit Traffic Local Traffic
146 Mobile Prefix Solicitation Should Not Will
147 Mobile Prefix Advertisement Should Not Will
148 Certificate Path Solicitation Will Must Not
149 Certificate Path Advertisement Will Must Not
150 Seamoby Experimental Policy Defined Will
151 Multicast Router Advertisement Will Must Not
152 Multicast Router Solicitation Will Must Not
153 Multicast Router Termination Will Must Not
154 - 199 Informative Policy Defined Should
200 - 201 Experimental Should Should
202 - 254 Informative Policy Defined Should
255 Extension Should Should
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Protocol numbers used in IPv6 header field called the “Next Header” field
registed by IANA [16] as of February 2013.
Decimal Keyword Protocol
0 HOPOPT IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option
1 ICMP Internet Control Message
2 IGMP Internet Group Management
3 GGP Gateway-to-Gateway
4 IPv4 IPv4 encapsulation
5 ST Stream
6 TCP Transmission Control
7 CBT CBT
8 EGP Exterior Gateway Protocol
9 IGP
any private interior gateway
(used by Cisco for their IGRP)
10 BBN-RCC-MON BBN RCC Monitoring
11 NVP-II Network Voice Protocol
12 PUP PUP
13 ARGUS ARGUS
14 EMCON EMCON
15 XNET Cross Net Debugger
16 CHAOS Chaos
17 UDP User Datagram
18 MUX Multiplexing
19 DCN-MEAS DCN Measurement Subsystems
20 HMP Host Monitoring
21 PRM Packet Radio Measurement
22 XNS-IDP XEROX NS IDP
23 TRUNK-1 Trunk-1
24 TRUNK-2 Trunk-2
25 LEAF-1 Leaf-1
26 LEAF-2 Leaf-2
27 RDP Reliable Data Protocol
28 IRTP Internet Reliable Transaction
29 ISO-TP4 ISO Transport Protocol Class 4
30 NETBLT Bulk Data Transfer Protocol
31 MFE-NSP MFE Network Services Protocol
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Decimal Keyword Protocol
32 MERIT-INP MERIT Internodal Protocol
33 DCCP Datagram Congestion Control Protocol
34 3PC Third Party Connect Protocol
35 IDPR Inter-Domain Policy Routing Protocol
36 XTP XTP
37 DDP Datagram Delivery Protocol
38 IDPR-CMTP IDPR Control Message Transport Proto
39 TP++ TP++ Transport Protocol
40 IL IL Transport Protocol
41 IPv6 IPv6 encapsulation
42 SDRP Source Demand Routing Protocol
43 IPv6-Route Routing Header for IPv6
44 IPv6-Frag Fragment Header for IPv6
45 IDRP Inter-Domain Routing Protocol
46 RSVP Reservation Protocol
47 GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
48 DSR Dynamic Source Routing Protocol
49 BNA BNA
50 ESP Encap Security Payload
51 AH Authentication Header
52 I-NLSP Integrated Net Layer Security TUBA
53 SWIPE IP with Encryption
54 NARP NBMA Address Resolution Protocol
55 MOBILE IP Mobility
56 TLSP
Transport Layer Security Protocol
using Kryptonet key management
57 SKIP SKIP
58 IPv6-ICMP ICMP for IPv6
59 IPv6-NoNxt No Next Header for IPv6
60 IPv6-Opts Destination Options for IPv6
61 any host internal protocol
62 CFTP CFTP
63 any local network
64 SAT-EXPAK SATNET and Backroom EXPAK
65 KRYPTOLAN Kryptolan
66 RVD MIT Remote Virtual Disk Protocol
67 IPPC Internet Pluribus Packet Core
68 any distributed file system
69 SAT-MON SATNET Monitoring
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Decimal Keyword Protocol
70 VISA VISA Protocol
71 IPCV Internet Packet Core Utility
72 CPNX Computer Protocol Network Executive
73 CPHB Computer Protocol Heart Beat
74 WSN Wang Span Network
75 PVP Packet Video Protocol
76 BR-SAT-MON Backroom SATNET Monitoring
77 SUN-ND SUN ND PROTOCOL-Temporary
78 WB-MON WIDEBAND Monitoring
79 WB-EXPAK WIDEBAND EXPAK
80 ISO-IP ISO Internet Protocol
81 VMTP VMTP
82 SECURE-VMTP SECURE-VMTP
83 VINES VINES
84 TTP TTP
84 IPTM Protocol Internet Protocol Traffic Manager
85 NSFNET-IGP NSFNET-IGP
86 DGP Dissimilar Gateway Protocol
87 TCF TCF
88 EIGRP EIGRP
89 OSPFIGP OSPFIGP
90 Sprite-RPC Sprite RPC Protocol
91 LARP Locus Address Resolution Protocol
92 MTP Multicast Transport Protocol
93 AX.25 AX.25 Frames
94 IPIP IP-within-IP Encapsulation Protocol
95 MICP Mobile Internetworking Control Pro.
96 SCC-SP Semaphore Communications Sec. Pro.
97 ETHERIP Ethernet-within-IP Encapsulation
98 ENCAP Encapsulation Header
99 any private encryption scheme
100 GMTP GMTP
101 IFMP Ipsilon Flow Management Protocol
102 PNNI PNNI over IP
103 PIM Protocol Independent Multicast
104 ARIS ARIS
105 SCPS SCPS
106 QNX QNX
107 A/N Active Networks
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Attachment III - Next Header
Decimal Keyword Protocol
108 IPComp IP Payload Compression Protocol
109 SNP Sitara Networks Protocol
110 Compaq-Peer Compaq Peer Protocol
111 IPX-in-IP IPX in IP
112 VRRP Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol
113 PGM PGM Reliable Transport Protocol
114 any 0-hop protocol
115 L2TP Layer Two Tunneling Protocol
116 DDX D-II Data Exchange (DDX)
117 IATP Interactive Agent Transfer Protocol
118 STP Schedule Transfer Protocol
119 SRP SpectraLink Radio Protocol
120 UTI UTI
121 SMP Simple Message Protocol
122 SM SM
123 PTP Performance Transparency Protocol
124 ISIS over IPv4
125 FIRE
126 CRTP Combat Radio Transport Protocol
127 CRUDP Combat Radio User Datagram
128 SSCOPMCE
129 IPLT
130 SPS Secure Packet Shield
131 PIPE Private IP Encapsulation within IP
132 SCTP Stream Control Transmission Protocol
133 FC Fibre Channel
134 RSVP-E2E-IGNORE
135 Mobility Header
136 UDPLite
137 MPLS-in-IP
138 manet MANET Protocols
139 HIP Host Identity Protocol
140 Shim6 Shim6 Protocol
141 WESP Wrapped Encapsulating Security Payload
142 ROHC Robust Header Compression
143-252 Unassigned
253 Use for experimentation and testing
254 Use for experimentation and testing
255 Reserved
74
